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Despite the growth and interest in the agribusiness profession, what constitutes agribusiness 
management research continues to be a perennial debate (Barry, Sonka, and Lajili, 1992; 
Harling, 1995; Robbins, 1988). Understanding what is or what is not agribusiness management 
research is fundamentally dictated by its definition. Since Davis and Goldberg's (1957) seminal 
definition of agribusiness, 1
 
  agribusiness has subsequently been defined in various ways, such as 
agro-industrialization (Boehlje 1999; Cook and Chaddad 2000), value, or net chains (Lazzarini, 
Chaddad, and Cook, 2001) or agriceuticals (Goldberg 1999). These definitions share a common 
emphasis for the “interdependence” of the various sectors of the agri-food supply chain that work 
towards the production, manufacturing, distribution, and retailing of food products and services 
(Boehlje, 1999; Cook and Chaddad, 2000).  
Despite such an attention to the interdependent nature of agribusinesses, this interdependence 
cannot be understood independently of the behavior of the underlying agribusiness firm. 
Agribusiness researchers contend that the behavior of the agribusiness firm is typically explained 
by neoclassical economic principles of the production theory of the firm (Barry, 1999; Robbins, 
1988; Sporleder, 1992; Westgren and Zering, 1998). This appears to be consistent with Harling’s 
(1995) survey of AAEA members. Harling (1995) found that the majority viewed agribusiness 
management as a sub-discipline of agricultural economics (52% agreed with this statement) and 
that agribusiness management was the application of economics to agricultural businesses (53% 
agreed with this statement). In fact, Casavant and Infanger (1984) and Woolverton et al. (1985) 
viewed agribusiness as a special case of agricultural economics (see also Robbins, 1988).  
 
Although various agribusiness researchers (e.g., Casavant and Infanger, 1984; Robbins, 1988; 
Woolverton et al., 1985) have viewed economics as “the appropriate tool for thinking about the 
management” (Harling, 1995, p. 503) of the agribusiness firm, Harling’s (1995) survey, 
nevertheless, found that 70% surveyed viewed economics and management as distinctly different 
disciplines. In fact, “99% agreed that more than production and cost functions were needed to 
understand a business” (Harling, 1995, p. 506).  Harling (1995), as well as French et al. (1993), 
have thus argued that in order to advance agribusiness management as a discipline, there is a 
distinct need for managerial explanations of firm behavior. This was recognized earlier by 
Westgren and Cook (1986) who noted, “if inroads are to be made in agribusiness management 
research, cross-disciplinary efforts are necessary” (p. 488).  
 
Yet, despite such earlier calls, the advancement of agribusiness management as a discipline has 
been “sporadic” (Cook and Chaddad, 2000). Cook and Chaddad (2000) describe that “the 
evolution of this field [agribusiness management] has been sporadic with bursts of research 
activity and then periods of little or no activity” (p. 212). Although there are numerous possible 
explanations, such sporadic developments can be attributed to a basic philosophical challenge 
faced by agribusiness researchers: agribusiness researchers “…want to be true to their own 
predilections towards management yet have to satisfy the majority [agricultural economics] that 
thinks in terms of economics.” (Harling, 1995, p. 509). That is, since agribusiness management 
                                                        
1 The term agribusiness was originally defined as: “the sum total of all operations involved in the manufacture and 
distribution of farm supplies; production operations of the farm; and the storage, processing, and distribution of farm 
commodities made from them” (Davis and Goldberg, 1957, p. 2). Ng and Siebert / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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in the USA is generally viewed as a sub-discipline of agricultural economics, agribusiness 
researchers are subject to the belief systems and scientific rules of appraisal of an economics 
paradigm,2
 
  and thus agribusiness management research becomes one of  “…satisfy[ing] the 
majority that thinks in terms of economics.” (Harling 1995). Consequently, it comes as little 
surprise that researchers over the years have found it difficult to distinguish research that is 
agribusiness management from that of agricultural economics (e.g., French et al., 1993). In fact, 
agribusiness scholars, such as Akridge and Gunderson (2005), have noted “one might 
characterize the current state of agribusiness scholarship as fragmented: it has been difficult to 
generate critical mass around any specific area; no true agribusiness literature has been 
developed” (p. 5).  
Hence, given that agribusiness management operates largely within the domain of agricultural 
economics, 3 the problem facing the advancement of agribusiness management is then how to 
develop its research identity? 4
 
  To this end, various agribusiness researchers have called for a 
greater attention to “strategic management” explanations of the firm (e.g., Cotterill and 
Westgren, 1994; French and Westgren, 1986; Gray et al., 2004; Harling, 1995; Peterson, 1997; 
Van Duren et al., 2003; French et al., 1993). This is because agribusiness faces the same research 
challenges and shares a similar focus to firm level behaviors with that of management rather than 
that of economics (e.g., Akridge and Gunderson, 2005; Gray et al., 2004; Peterson, 1997; Van 
Duren et al., 2003). For instance, Micheels and Gow (2008) draw on a market orientation 
perspective (Slater and Narver, 1995) in conjunction with an entrepreneurial approach to explain 
the performance of beef cattle producers. Mainville and Peterson (2006) enhance Transaction 
Cost Economics (Williamson 1975) analysis with a grounded theory approach towards studying 
the vertical coordination decisions in São Paulo’s fresh produce market. Sporleder et al. (2008) 
examines food product innovation from the context of first mover strategy research (Lieberman 
and Montgomery, 1998).  
However, despite these varied advancements to agribusiness management, the advancement of a 
field is also predicated on defining a field’s set of fundamental questions or issues. For instance, 
progress in the field of strategic management has and continues to be made through its efforts to 
define its central issues of concern because resolution of such issues serves to elevate the field to 
a high level of inquiry (Hoskisson et al., 1999; Rumelt et al., 1994). As a result, since there have 
been increasing calls to draw on strategic management explanations of the agribusiness firm, 
understanding some of the central questions or issues of strategy can be important to not only 
help “frame” the research boundaries of agribusiness management, but such framing can be 
important to highlighting potential limitations in economic treatments of agribusiness research.5
                                                        
2 This places agribusiness professors at a disadvantage, Gholson and Barker (1985) explains from Kuhn (1977) that, 
“it is impossible to claim the objective superiority of one paradigm over any other. This is because the rules to 
appraise scientific procedures - and experimental results - are supplied by the paradigm themselves…Judgments 
based on such rules, then, would favor the paradigm from where they were selected” (p. 756). 
  
3 Harling (1995) also reported that many considered its place in departments of agricultural economics as a place of 
convenience rather than its association with the discipline. 
4 Nothing in this paper is meant to detract from the substantial work agricultural economics perform for agribusiness 
firms.  This specialized research pertains to many areas, including but not limited to: consumer marketing, 
quantitative analysis, obesity, horticultural economics, international trade, et cetera. 
5 For a complete exploration of the many and varied elements of strategic management, the reader is referred to 
Mintzberg et al. (1998). Ng and Siebert / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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For instance, as the firm is the primary unit of analysis in strategy, a basic question of strategy 
research is “why are there firms?” (Rumelt, 1994, p. 39; see also Seth and Thomas, 1994). Such 
a question is non-trivial because Rumelt et al. (1994) argued that economic explanations take the 
existence of the firm as a given, and thus provide an “unsatisfactory” explanation of a firm’s 
existence. Second, an economic theory of the firm is incomplete in its explanations of how firms 
behave (Rumelt 1994). This is because the economic theory of firm is predicated on the rational 
behaviors of “economic man,” and thus does not recognize the inherent cognitive and 
information limits of managers. Third, how firms grow has been a subject of long standing 
interest by strategy researchers (e.g., Ng, 2007; Sirmon et al. 2007) because the process of firm 
growth directly impacts a firm’s diversification into new lines of business (e.g., Fréry, 2006; 
Porter, 1996). In fact, the subject of diversified growth is an important area to agribusiness 
management research because explaining “what business we are in” has been identified as an 
important issue in this field (French et al., 1993; Westgren and Cook, 1986). Yet, due to the 
equilibrium orientation of production economics, such economic treatments of the firm 
understate concerns about the process of a firm’s diversified growth. Lastly, since the concept of 
strategy is fundamentally based on a unique or differentiated competitive position (Porter 1996), 
the question of “why are firms different?” (Barney, 1986, 1991; Hoskisson et al., 1999; Mahoney 
and Pandian, 1992; Rumelt et al., 1994) calls into question production economics’ assumption of 
firm homogeneity.  
 
As the field of agribusiness operates largely within the domain of agricultural economics, this 
study argues that the examination of these research questions and their associated management 
theories can provide a reference point to help shape dialogue about the boundaries of 
agribusiness management research. Specifically, the advancement of agribusiness management 
faces a basic challenge that not only requires “cross-disciplinary” efforts into management (e.g., 
Akridge and Gunderson, 2005; Boehlje, 2005; Westgren and Cook, 1986), but such efforts also 
require clear distinctions from economic explanations of agribusinesses. Such distinctions are 
important to developing management explanations of the agribusiness firm that could not be 
explained by economic principles alone. Hence, the objective of this study is to examine some of 
the key questions of strategy and to outline the pertinent theories used in resolving such 
concerns. In addressing some of the key questions of strategy, four areas of strategy are 
examined that involve Coase’s (1937) treatment on the “nature of the firm,” Simon’s (1957, 
1976) concept of bounded rationality, Penrose’s (1959) theory of the growth of the firm, and 
subsequently Barney’s (1986, 1991) Resource-Based View. The relevance and implications of 
each of these various explanations to the study of the agribusiness firm are also discussed. We 
conclude with the contributions and implications of this study. 
   
Some Conceptual Underpinnings of Strategic Management  
 
What is Strategy? 
 
Although there are various definitions of strategy, the origins of strategy have been traced to 
Alfred Chandler’s (1962) seminal work on Strategy and Structure in which strategy is defined as 
“…the determination of the basic long term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the 
adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these 
goals” (p. 13).  A strategy is a purposeful plan involving the allocation of a firm’s internal Ng and Siebert / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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resources to service a particular product-market (or service-market) that yields a superior 
competitive position relative to rival firms. As such, the concept of strategy maintains that 
deliberated or purposeful action is a core tenet because the firm is not merely a responder to 
market prices – as reflected by an economic view of the firm (French and Westgren, 1986; Seth 
and Thomas, 1994), but rather the firm can create fundamental changes to the market. For 
instance, the strategy of Howard Schultz, the founder of Starbucks, was to put forth a new or 
innovative coffee retail concept that not only redefined a model for retailing premium coffee, but 
has subsequently become a subculture in N. American society. Schultz’s strategy of redefining 
the consumption of coffee as a “lifestyle” experience underscores the essence of strategy, which 
is about developing a unique competitive position through performing activities that are different 
from those of its rivals. This reflects Porter (1996) contention that “competitive strategy is about 
being different. It means deliberately choosing a different set of activities to deliver a unique mix 
of value” (p. 64). In the case of Starbucks, especially during their earlier years, their competitive 
strategy rested on activities involving the development of proprietary roasting curves, extensive 
training of baristas, a streamlined bean-coffee value chain that preserved coffee freshness; all of 
such activities created a unique and unrivalled coffee experience that served a newly created 
consumer group (Ioannou 1998).  
 
Given this concept of strategy, the ultimate goal of a firm’s strategy is to create and sustain a 
differentiated or competitive position that yields long-term gains (e.g., Fréry, 2006; Porter, 
1996). Such a characterization of strategy renders it distinct from the economic concept of 
operational efficiency (Porter 1996). This is because operational efficiencies involve 
“…performing similar activities better than rivals perform them” (Porter, 1996, p. 62). For 
instance, since production economics typically assumes that firms are homogeneous, the 
economic firm is thereby involved in activities that are similar to those of others. Differences 
between economic firms are thereby restricted to differences in scale (Seth and Thomas, 1994) 
that involve differences in technical efficiencies from producing the “same” output. While, since 
the concept of strategy is based on developing “different” activities or positions, strategy is, 
thereby, distinct from such improvements in operational efficiencies (Porter 1996). Hence, in the 
language of production economics, strategy is not about operating at the frontier of a firm’s 
production function, but rather involve the development of an entirely different one. Another 
further distinction is that although improvements in operational efficiencies positively contribute 
to a firm’s performance or profits, the economic concept of operational efficiencies cannot be a 
source of sustainable gain. This is because improvements in a firm’s operational efficiencies are 
predicated on performing the “same” activity better than its rivals. Since these activities are 
known by rivals, rivals can eventually imitate a firm’s operational efficiencies. For instance, 
despite being the early adopter to EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) systems in the early 1970s, 
Wal-Mart’s improvements in operational efficiencies in inventory management were eventually 
imitated by its rival K-mart.  In short, although strategy is commonly associated with 
improvements in operational efficiencies, strategy is fundamentally distinct from the concept of 
operational efficiency because of its distinct recognition that a firm’s unique or heterogeneous 
competitive positions underlie a firm’s sustainable gains.  
 
Why do Firms Exist?  
 
As the concept as well as goal of strategy places the firm as the central unit of investigation (e.g., 
Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Seth and Thomas, 1994), a question relevant to the study of Ng and Siebert / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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strategy is: why do firms exist? (Coase, 1937; Rumelt et al., 1994). From an economics 
standpoint, a firm’s existence is argued by the “given” existence of its production function. Yet, 
a production theory of the firm ironically does not offer a substantive explanation for why a firm 
should even exist at all (Coase 1937). This is because, if markets are efficient, then why are 
activities that could be performed in the market conducted within the firm? As Coase (1937) 
notes: 
 “Yet, having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, 
production could be carried on without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is 
there any organization?” (p. 388). 
 
Namely, if prices are known (which generally speaking means the absence of transaction costs), 
a firm can technically exist by outsourcing all of its input and output activities through a series of 
contractual arrangements.  If there are no transaction costs (i.e., no costs in finding the relevant 
prices, and no costs in drafting, negotiating, and monitoring the terms of a market exchange) in 
the procurement and assembly of input ingredients, a firm can therefore manufacture a product 
without physically having a facility because the assembly of these ingredients can be outsourced 
through a series of costless contractual exchanges.  Hence, in the absence of transaction costs, 
there is no reason why a production economic view of the firm should even exist. But as acutely 
noted by Coase (1937), there is a transaction cost in using the market. A firm exists because of 
its ability to reduce the transaction costs. 
 
A firm exists because, through virtue of its “authority,” it serves to minimize the transaction 
costs of market exchange (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). Unlike a production economic view 
of the firm, authority is the defining feature of a firm, which reflects a super and subordinate 
contractual relationship between that of the employer and their employees. Within the prescribed 
limits of an employment contract, the employee in exchange for wages agrees to be dictated by 
the employer in any circumstance not explicitly stated in the original employment contract 
(Coase, 1937; Langlois, 2007). Such an authority relationship offers a distinct advantage in 
reducing the transaction costs of market exchange because an employment contract replaces 
many market exchanges for one (Coase, 1937; Langlois, 2007; Williamson, 1975).  Moreover, 
since the specific details of an employment contract need not be fully specified (Coase, 1937), an 
authority relationship can more readily adapt to unanticipated changes. This is because the 
employer can simply instruct or direct the employee to conduct changes in their work 
responsibilities to account for new environmental contingencies (Langlois,  2007).  As a result, a 
firm exists because its authority relationship economizes on these transaction costs of market 
exchange and provides a greater ability to adapt to environmental variation. 
 
By substituting the market price mechanism, Coase’s (1937) insights on a firm’s authority have 
been instrumental to Williamson’s (1975) Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). Transaction Cost 
Economics underscore that the market and the firm (i.e., hierarchy) reflect distinct governance 
structures in which the transaction costs associated with the procurement of a given activity 
between these alternative governance structures dictate the mode of governance.  In other words, 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is concerned with a “make or buy” decision (Williamson, 
1975) in which for a given activity, a firm’s choice of either procuring this activity from the 
market (i.e., buy), such as an outsourcing decision, or to perform this same activity within the 
firm (i.e., make) is dependent on the governance structure that minimizes transaction costs. This Ng and Siebert / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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transaction cost minimizing insight has been the basis for Williamson’s (1975) arguments in 
which he contends “make or buy” decisions can be derived by combining “human behavior as 
we know it,” such as bounded rationality or opportunism, with the dimensions of transactions, 
such as asset specificity, large/small numbers situations, or uncertainty (Williamson 1975).  
 
In particular, Williamson (1975) asserts that the presence of asset specificity and opportunism 
(such as, cheating, lying, and stealing) favors the replacement of the market in favor of a firm’s 
authority.  In the presence of asset specificity, a firm faces few alternative uses for their assets. 
For example, in recent years there has been an increasing demand for “small” or bite size 
potatoes by specialty restaurant companies. The harvesting of such “small” potatoes, however, 
requires specialized and expensive equipment (upwards of $250,000) that can only be utilized for 
the harvest of potatoes of this size. Since such harvesting equipment cannot be utilized to harvest 
other potatoes, such as Russet potatoes, it has a low alternative use value. This asset specificity 
creates a problem for market-based transactions because, with opportunism, the buyer of the 
potatoes could “hold-up” the potato producer by demanding price concessions on the sale of their 
small potatoes. This ‘hold up’ arises because the specialized harvest equipment has limited 
alternatives uses, so the potato producer has little choice but to accept this lower price. Due to 
this hold-up problem, a market-based exchange is avoided because the potato producer would 
have to incur costs in monitoring and enforcing the terms of the sales agreement with its buyer. 
In that, due to such higher transaction costs, TCE would argue that this market-based exchange 
be supplanted by a firm’s authority. This is because as an authority relationship enables the direct 
monitoring and enforcement of employees’ actions, a firm’s authority can circumvent such 
problems of hold-up. The potato producer would, thus, favor the integration of a buying activity 
into the firm, such as a forward integration into potato distribution.  
 
An important distinction of Coase’s (1937) insights and its subsequent developments to 
Williamson’s (1975) transaction costs analysis is that they have been instrumental to explaining 
the vertical integration of agribusinesses. Vertical integration/coordination decisions have been 
examined in a variety of agribusiness industries, such as pork, cattle, and chicken (e.g., Barry et 
al., 1992; Cook and Barry, 2004; Cook and Chaddad, 2000; Purcell and Hudson, 2003; 
Sporleder, 1992). As a result, by addressing the question of why firms exist, Coase’s (1937) and 
Williamson’s (1975) insights not only offer a different basis for explaining the nature of the 
existence of the firm, but their insights have yielded significant implications to explaining 
vertical integration decisions that cannot be explained using a production economics framework.   
 
How do Firms Behave?  
 
Another salient distinction between strategic management and production economics pertains to 
their assumptions about firm behavior (Rumelt et al., 1994; Seth and Thomas, 1994). A defining 
feature of economics is its quest to explain phenomena as the results of rational choice (Rumelt, 
et al., 1994). For instance, from a production economics standpoint, a firm’s profit maximizing 
behavior is typically modeled by the first order condition where marginal revenue is equated 
with marginal costs. Such a rational explanation of firm choice is appealing because the 
underlying mathematical formulism provides unambiguous predictions on the firm’s optimal 
choice of output and subsequent price. Such profit maximizing behaviors are predicated, 
however, on the assumption that managers face no limitations in their information set and/or 
abilities in computing their optimal scale and prices.  Ng and Siebert / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
 
 2009 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
130 
However, unlike the rational premises of economics, strategic management is founded on a 
“realist” approach to the examination of the firm (e.g., Godfrey and Hill, 1995; Peterson, 1997). 
A “realist” approach favors a more holistic understanding of the complexities and details that 
confront real world businesses (e.g., Godfrey and Hill, 1995; Peterson, 1997). A realist approach 
recognizes that individual decision making is flawed or at best incomplete. Strategic 
management research is distinctly cognizant of this fact in which it recognizes that a manager’s 
decision making behaviors are “boundedly rational” (Hoskisson et al., 1999; Rumelt et al., 1994; 
Seth and Thomas, 1994; Simon, 1957). Specifically, according to Simon (1957), the concept of 
bounded rationality refers to: 
 
“The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very 
small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively 
rational behavior in the real world or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective 
rationality” (p.198). 
 
A basic tenet of Simon’s (1976) concept of bounded rationality is that he rejects the 
“motivational and cognitive assumptions underlying the rationality of ‘economic man’” (Seth 
and Thomas, 1994, p. 173).  This is because with “economic man” maximizing behavior requires 
a complete knowledge of all possible states, as well as a complete understanding of their 
consequences (Simon, 1957, 1976).  Simon (1976) argues the more realistic “administrative 
man” – as opposed to economic man – makes decisions through a mental model that is based on 
a highly simplified view of the world.  As Seth and Thomas (1994) note, the “administrative 
man” has a limited ability to “formulate comprehensive models of the world and to process 
information; thus maximizing behavior becomes impossible” (p. 173).  As the “administrative 
man” is not able to maximize amongst all available alternatives, decision making is driven 
instead by “satisficing.” 
 
Satisficing is a heuristic that economizes on an individual’s limited cognitive faculties. With 
satisficing, the administrative man does not seek an optimal or best solution, but rather “…looks 
for a course of action that is satisfactory or ‘good enough’ ” (Simon, 1976, p. xxix).  Simon 
(1987) explains “satisficing” with an analogy in which he likens the optimizing behaviors of 
economics to “looking for the sharpest needle in the haystack” (optimizing), while comparing 
satisficing to “looking for a needle sharp enough to sew with” (satisficing) (p. 244).  Hence, 
unlike the first order calculus of economic agents, managers do not optimize a firm’s profits 
through equating marginal revenue with marginal costs. Instead, managers satisfice by seeking 
an “adequate” level of profit, “fair price,” or some “acceptable” level of market share (Simon 
1976).  
 
To elaborate, such satisficing behavior arises when managers are dissatisfied with a current 
solution or strategy.  Dissatisfaction induces a search for a new or alternative course of action. 
Yet, due to limits imposed by bounded rationality, this search for a new solution does not involve 
a comprehensive search for all possible alternatives.  Rather, the search concludes with the first 
solution that satisfies or meets the managers’ expectations. Such expectations are commonly 
referred to as a target level of performance (such as a firm’s historical performance) and have 
been commonly described by a firm’s “aspirations” (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1976).  
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Because satisficing stimulates a firm’s search, the concept of satisficing has also been 
instrumental to explaining a firm’s risk behaviors (March, 1988; March and Shapira, 1987, 
1992).  Specifically, when a firm’s performance (e.g., profit) falls below its aspirations, the 
resulting dissatisfaction leads to a search for more attractive and riskier alternatives (March and 
Shapira, 1987, 1992).  This follows directly from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979), which finds individuals tend to be risk seeking in losses.  For instance, during the late 
1990s when the breakfast cereal industry was facing increasing competition from private label 
brands, Kellogg experienced increasing financial losses. During this period, the CEO of Kellogg, 
Mr. Gutierrez, undertook increasing risks by investing in R&D to develop new food breakfast 
cereal products, such as developing the Nutribars product category (Boyle 2004).  
 
The search for riskier alternatives is, however, arrested with success or when a firm’s 
performance exceeds or satisfies its aspirations (Chen and Miller, 2007; March and Shapira, 
1987, 1992).  With success, a firm does not want to risk losing what it has earned. Success, thus, 
leads to risk-averse behaviors that involve a commitment to the status quo (March, 1988). For 
instance, Chen and Miller’s (2007) study of U.S. manufacturing firms found that when a firm’s 
performance exceeded its aspirations, there was an associated reduction in the firm’s R&D 
intensity (measured as R&D as a percentage of sales). Such findings have also been supported by 
prospect theory, which finds that individuals become increasingly risk averse as they realize 
increasing gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
  
The concept of bounded rationality and subsequent notion of satisficing raises two significant 
behavioral implications for a theory of the agribusiness firm.  First, agribusiness researchers 
(Westgren and Cook, 1986) have called for a greater psychological or behavioral basis of 
agribusiness firm behavior. Hence, the behavioral assumption of bounded rationality not only 
yields a greater consideration for the cognitive constraints of management, but as a consequence 
distinctly recognizes the decision realities faced by managers. More significantly, however, such 
an appeal to a more realistic explanation of managerial behaviors not only distinguishes the 
behavior of the agribusiness firm from that of production economics explanations, but also raises 
deep-seated philosophical and methodological implications regarding what truly constitutes 
agribusiness firm management research (e.g., Peterson, 1997).  
 
An appeal to realism yields a second implication that is of direct interest to practicing managers. 
Since bounded rationality results in “satisficing” behaviors, satisficing impacts an agribusiness 
firm’s response to risk. Namely, during conditions of financial duress, satisficing predicts that an 
agribusiness firm is more likely to undertake greater risk, such as those risks involved in the 
exploration of new product initiatives (e.g., Kellogg).  Such risk taking involves a form of 
“explorative” search that extends the firm’s existing competencies, technologies, and experiences 
(March, 1991).  For instance, during the early 1990s, increasing public concern over cholesterol 
led to significant declines in the consumption of eggs in the North America. Egg producers 
responded by undertaking  greater risk-taking activities, including adding new functional 
attributes to eggs, such as Omega-3, that reduced the incidence of heart diseases. As a result of 
such risk taking efforts, these explorations led to the development of the Omega-3 egg product 
(e.g., Bouphasiri et al., 2003; Katz, 1999). 
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Conversely, as a firm’s risk taking behavior is curtailed by success, success favors lower risks 
activities that involve a commitment to “exploitive search” (March, 1991).  Unlike the risk 
taking behaviors of exploration, exploitive search involves a deepening or a refining of a firm’s 
existing competencies, technologies, and experiences (March, 1991).  For instance, SYSCO’s 
commitment to exploit its cost efficiencies in distribution and logistics can be explained by such 
risk adverse behaviors in which its historic success may limit its ability to extend operations 
beyond the food service segment (64% of sales in food service) (SYSCO Annual Report, 2007).  
This is consistent with Prahalad and Bettis’ (1986) notion of “dominant logic” in which a firm’s 
success commits its behaviors to those that were successful in the past. 
 
How do Firms Grow? 
 
Bounded rationality has also been the basis for Penrose’s (1959) theory of the growth of the firm. 
However, according to Penrose (1959), a firm’s growth is not only subject to limits on a firm’s 
bounded rationality (that is a firm’s growth is limited by the imaginations and cognitions of its 
managers), but Penrose (1959) also argues that a firm grows through a process of diversification. 
Namely, as one of the most seminal influences to strategic management research (Hoskisson et 
al., 1999; Kor and Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Ng, 2007), Penrose’s (1959) 
theory of diversified growth reflects a distinct departure from the “equilibrium” orientation of 
production economics in which she attributes a firm’s diversified growth from an internal 
inducement to seek better or varied uses from its heterogeneous, indivisible, and discrete 
resources. 
 
To explain, Penrose (1959) argues that a firm’s resources are heterogeneous insofar as they can 
render multiple related and even unrelated products/services from the same set of resources (i.e., 
assets).  Resources can be applied in different ways to yield different productive services or uses. 
For example, should a cheese plant emphasize innovation in the production and sale of cheese 
(e.g., Leprino Foods) or instead in the production and sale of the co-product whey (for example 
Hilmar Cheese)?  Heterogeneous resources are also indivisible or lumpy, which can create 
excess capacity. This stands in contrast to the free disposal assumption of the Leontief 
production function in which Penrose (1959) argues excess resources are not costlessly disposed, 
but rather are a primary inducement for a firm’s growth (again the case of Hilmar mentioned 
above). However, to fully utilize excess resources, lumpy resources are used in discrete or 
complementary proportions, whereby the greater utilization of one set of heterogeneous and 
lumpy resources requires the use of another set of related yet lumpy resources (Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt, 1988; Penrose, 1959). As these resources are combined in complementary 
proportions, they yield synergies that favor the discovery of new but related products. Hence, 
due to the heterogeneous, lumpy, and discrete nature of resources, firms tend to grow in a 
process that favors related product diversification. 
 
Because one of the research questions of agribusiness involves determining “what business are 
we in?” (French et al., 1993; Westgren and Cook, 1986), Penrose (1959) can contribute to 
agribusiness management research by offering an approach to explaining the scope of the 
agribusiness firm. In particular, a key insight of Penrose (1959) is that the heterogeneous, 
discrete and lumpy nature of resources can offer internal opportunities for an agribusiness firm to 
diversify into new and related productive services and products. Ng and Siebert / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
 




For instance, rather than respond to the conditions of market demand, ADM’s growth strategy 
has traditionally been one of building and utilizing its excess processing capacity through 
discovering new and related product streams (Goldberg and Urban, 1997). Such excess 
processing capacity stemmed from the fact the investments in processing assets were not 
incremental in cost (Goldberg and Urban, 1997). The lumpy nature of these assets not only 
affords internal opportunities to exploit economies of scale, but also scope economies. This is 
because ADM’s processing plants have heterogeneous or multiple uses whereby processing plant 
assets can not only be used for processing corn for human (e.g. high fructose corn syrup) and 
animal consumption (e.g. animal feed), but also for the production of corn-ethanol. Hence, 
ADM’s excess processing capacity not only reflected the lumpy resources described by Penrose 
(1959), but the processing plants exhibited heterogeneous uses. Furthermore, diversification into 
the corn-ethanol market also requires that the heterogeneous and lumpy nature of ADM’s plant 
assets be combined with other complementary assets. That is, diversification into the corn-
ethanol market also requires the greater use of procurement assets in transportation and 
distribution. Since related diversification stems from developing products that draw on a 
common pool of assets, ADM’s diversification into the corn-ethanol market is thereby reflective 
of the related growth processes described by Penrose (1959). 
 
One implication of Penrose’s (1959) theory of diversified growth is that the heterogeneous 
nature of resources or assets provides an important extension to economic explanations of 
technological growth. Penrose’s attention to the heterogeneous nature of resources underscores 
that the discovery of new uses from a firm’s lumpy and discrete resources can be an internal 
catalyst for the development of new production possibilities. This is a significant departure from 
production economic explanations of firm growth because growth in a firm’s production function 
(i.e., outward shifts in the production frontier) is primarily attributed to exogenous technological 
advances in the market. Yet, since Penrose (1959) underscores that the growth of the firm is 
largely a function of a management’s ability to seek new varied uses from its lumpy, and discrete 
resources, a firm’s growth is, thereby, not exclusively dictated by the technological 
developments of the market. 
 
Why are Firms Different? 
 
The emphasis on heterogeneous resources is not only a key underpinning to Penrose’s (1959) 
theory of firm growth, but has subsequently become a defining feature of the ubiquitous 
Resource-Based View (RBV) (Barney, 1986, 1991; Hoskisson et al., 1999). The RBV (Barney, 
1986, 1991) has been argued by many as one of the most significant developments in strategic 
management research (Hoskisson et al., 1999).  This is because as the objective of strategy is to 
develop a “sustainable” competitive position (e.g., Fréry, 2006; Porter, 1996), the RBV contends 
that a firm’s heterogeneous resources are central to explaining systematic differences in a firm’s 
performance (Barney, 1986; Hoskisson et al., 1999). Specifically, Barney (1986) emphasizes that 
a firm’s resources are heterogeneous in terms of their value, rareness, and inimitability (VRI).6
These resource traits determine the degree to which a firm can sustain above normal levels of 
economic performance (Barney 1986). 
 
                                                        
6 In subsequent  work, Barney (2002) argued the importance of a firm’s organization to being able to capitalize upon 
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In explaining Barney’s (1986) VRI framework, valuable resources refer to the extent to which a 
firm’s resources can exploit and/or neutralize threats from its environment. For instance, food 
processing firms that adopt Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) protocols are 
considered a valuable resource because it addresses a market need for food safety. A valuable 
resource, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for sustaining a firm’s competitive 
advantage. This is because although HACCP protocols can be viewed as a valuable resource, 
such protocols are widely and uniformly adopted in food processing industries, and thus cannot 
be a source of competitive advantage. 7
 
   Furthermore, even if a firm possesses a valuable yet 
rare resource (for example patents held by an agricultural biotechnology firm), such a resource 
only offers a temporary source of competitive advantage. That is, patents are inherently imitable 
because patents require full disclosure to which such public knowledge is provided in exchange 
for a limited number of years of protection. Hence, as patents expire, patents will eventually be 
imitated by rivals, and thus are not a sustainable source of competitive advantage.  For instance, 
the ongoing expiration of Monsanto’s various patents forces Monsanto to undertake ongoing 
product innovations to preserve margins. This constant need to evolve gives emphasis to how 
very difficult it is to achieve inimitability.  
Barney (1986), thereby, argues that a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage depends on the 
inimitability of a firm’s valued and rare resources. Namely, as inimitable resources incurs a high 
cost of imitation, inimitable resource precludes other rivals from competing for the rents 
associated with a firm’s valued and rare assets and thus amongst resource traits, inimitability is 
the linchpin of a firm’s sustained competitive advantage (Fréry, 2006; King and Zeithaml, 2001, 
p. 75).  One example of such a linchpin would be Beef Products Incorporated’s (BPI) high-
protein meat production technology.  This technology converts packing plant trim into lean beef 
trimmings.  BPI’s technology enables an exact protein percentage standardization of hamburger 
while simultaneously reducing the probability of an E coli 0157:H57 contamination in that 
hamburger.  This later and very important result occurs due to increased pH levels in the meat 
(Salvage, 2003). Such technical advancements are largely unrivaled by BPI’s competitors. This 
is because much of BPI’s innovations stem from on ongoing trial and error experimentation 
processes that involve continually improving upon their established conversion technologies. As 
such a process involves learning curve experiences that take time to develop, BPI’s ability to 
continually develop innovations that convert meat trim into lean and safe ground beef is thus 
costly to imitate and thus a source of sustained competitive advantage (Kay, 2005).  
 
A more esoteric concept of inimitability pertains to causal ambiguity.  Causal ambiguity refers to 
the idea that the managers of potentially imitating firms (and even managers within the focal 
firm) may not be able to fully comprehend or may not be aware of the relationship between a 
firm’s resources and its effect on performance (Barney, 1991; King and Zeithaml, 2001).  For 
instance, managers who are boundedly rational have imperfect judgments about the performance 
implications of its rivals’ resources. Various agribusiness firms appear to be subject to some 
form of causal ambiguity.  Specifically, an agribusiness firm’s culture and reputation, for 
instance, that of Blue Bell Creameries, may be causally ambiguous because this organization’s 
culture is difficult to replicate in an environment that is external to the firm (e.g., Barney, 1991; 
King and Zeithaml, 2001). 
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A manager can also experience causal ambiguity pertaining to his or her own firm’s competitive 
advantage (King and Zeithaml, 2001).  For example, a manager can fail to understand how his or 
her own firm’s competitive advantage was developed.  King and Zeithaml (2001) suggest such a 
lack of understanding can limit a firm’s ability to leverage it resources internally. For instance, 
many agribusinesses have evolved from small family-farm-owned operations to larger, more 
complex organizations. With such added complexity, top and middle agribusiness managers are 
likely to exhibit different interpretations of the key factors contributing to their firm’s success.  
For example, an operational manager will perceive factors that relate to improvements in 
production efficiencies and cost control as key factors of success, while senior managers might 
view innovation as a more important factor of success.  As a production and innovation focus 
reflects very different organizational priorities, such differences in perception across the 
organization’s internal hierarchy can contribute to a lack of understanding and communication 
regarding a firm’s critical success factors (Bowman and Daniels, 1995; see also Porter, 1996).  
Hence, a basic implication of this form of causal ambiguity is that, as agribusiness firms evolve 
towards greater complexity, internal sources of causal ambiguity may limit their ability to 




The advancement of agribusiness management as a field has been sporadic (e.g., Cook and 
Chaddad, 2000). Early advancements of a field are often marred with a lack of a research identity 
(e.g., Kuhn, 1970). Agribusiness management can be thought of being in the pre-“paradigmatic” 
stage of science, as was strategic management in the early 1970s and 1980s (see Rumelt et al., 
1994; Hoskisson et al., 1999). During this period, progress in strategic management has and 
continues — to a lesser extent — struggle with delineating its central domains of research 
interest (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 1999; Rumelt et al., 1994). This is because strategic management 
is inherently a pluralistic field that embraces not only economics, but also fields such as 
psychology, organizational behavior, sociology, evolutionary biology, etc. Nevertheless, over 
time, strategic management has matured as an established field of inquiry, as evidenced by the 
growth in membership for associations such as the Academy of Management and Strategic 
Management Society and the growth in highly ranked management journals, such as Academy of 
Management Review, Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Organization Science, Journal of Management Studies, and 
Journal of Management, etc. One factor contributing to this growth has been a focus on a set of 
central concerns/issues in which their resolution has elevated the disciplinary status of this field 
(e.g., Rumelt et al., 1994). 
 
However, the advancement of agribusiness management as a field cannot simply be a replication 
of the model of scientific development used in strategic management. Agribusiness management 
is distinct from strategic management because it has historically operated within departments of 
agricultural economics. Hence, the advancement of agribusiness management faces a basic 
challenge that not only requires “cross-disciplinary” efforts into management (e.g., Akridge and 
Gunderson, 2005; Boehlje, 2005; Westgren and Cook, 1986), but such efforts also require clear 
distinctions from economic explanations of agribusinesses. Such distinctions are important to 
developing management explanations of the agribusiness firm that could not be explained by 
economic principles alone. In fact, in Harling’s (1995) study, he found that 88% surveyed 
disagreed (7% agreed) with the following statement:  “The economic theory of the firm provides Ng and Siebert / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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a fully satisfactory explanation of the business for the purposes of agribusiness management” (p. 
507). As a result, this suggests agribusiness management could focus on areas that are not well 
treated by production economic explanations.  
 
Thus, the purpose of this study was to outline four concerns and theories of management that can 
help define those areas in which a production economics approach would not be a sufficient 
explanation of agribusiness behavior. For instance, in response to the question of “why are there 
firms?” Coase (1937) argues that the omission of transaction costs in production economic 
analyses significantly understates a firm’s “authority.” “Authority” is instrumental to explaining 
vertical integration decisions that could not be explained by production economics alone. 
Second, the question of “how do firms behave?” (Rumelt et al., 1994) emphasizes that managers 
do not “optimize” in a fashion dictated by production economics, but rather managers make 
decisions through satisficing heuristics that involve a process of trial and error experimentation. 
Third, the question of how a firm grows offers an alternative to the equilibrium orientation of 
production economics. In particular, as the concept of an equilibrium is based on a long term 
outcome, production economics cannot sufficiently explain a firm’s short-run adjustment 
process, especially in regards to a firm’s related diversified growth. Lastly, the question of why 
firms differ? extends production economic explanations of firm performance.  Namely, the RBV 
extends product economic explanations by not only underscoring the heterogeneous nature of a 
firm’s assets, such as a firm’s brand and culture (e.g., Starbucks), knowledge capital (e.g., 3M, 
Google), technologies (e.g., Monsanto, BPI) etc., but also argues that the Value, Rareness and 
Inimitable nature of such resources impacts a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage.  
 
These four questions of strategy and associated theories can, thereby, serve as one basis for 
shaping the research opportunities of agribusiness management. However, it is also important to 
note that these areas of management should not be interpreted as the definitive basis of 
agribusiness management research, because the advancement of any field is a product of its 
contributing members. Hence, the purpose of this study is not to provide a comprehensive review 
of all the central questions and associated theories in strategic management, but rather to provide 
a point of reference for agribusiness management researchers in identifying a set of research 
questions, as well as research approaches in examining the behavior of the agribusiness firm. 
Furthermore, we believe the advancement of agribusiness management not only requires greater 
attention to management theories but also requires engaging a dialogue between agribusiness 
management researchers and agricultural economists.  
 
For instance, since agribusiness firms operate in a market environment, agricultural economics 
offers understanding of markets that can directly impact the functioning of the firm. For instance, 
the determination of market prices through analysis of factors influencing shifts and movements 
along demand and supply are important to determining a manager’s pricing strategies. 
Furthermore, agricultural economics research, especially those drawing from Industrial 
Organizational Economics (e.g. Carlton and Perloff, 2000), finds that market concentration can 
impact an industry’s market power. Market concentration, such as in pork and chicken 
processing industries, can thereby influence management’s ability to exert price discrimination. 
Agricultural economics is, thus, particularly suited to advancing agribusiness management 
research on issues relating market level phenomena to which have not been a primal focus of the 
firm level emphasis of management research. As a result, dialogue between agricultural Ng and Siebert / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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economics and agribusiness along these different levels of analyses serves to advance the 
pluralistic nature of agribusiness management. 
 
Furthermore, inter-firm levels of analysis are also another important feature of agribusiness 
management research. This is because in addition to the market level orientation of agricultural 
economics, the agribusiness firm also operates within a complex value chain. Originating from 
sociology research, value chain networks underscore that pattern of social exchanges amongst 
value chain members provides a source opportunity as well as constrain (Lazzarini et al., 2001; 
Omta et al., 2001). A basic premise of social networks and related alliance research in 
agribusiness studies is that the agribusiness firm is not an atomistic entity but rather the 
agribusiness firm is  “socially embedded” in a pattern of mutual relationships that can advance 
the interests of the firm (e.g. Lazzarini et al. 2001; Ng et al., 2006). That is, an agribusiness 
firm’s vertical as well as horizontal social exchanges are an important means to accessing 
external resources that are necessary in the provision of food products and services. This is an 
important aspect of agribusinesses because the production of food products are services are often 
the result of multiple technologies that are not held by any given firm. 
 
As a result, this study argues agribusiness management is fundamentally a multi-disciplinary 
endeavor because it operates at various levels of analysis - firm, inter-firm and market- that 
requires different disciplinary approaches. As a result, dialogue between the fields of 
management, sociology and economics and other related fields serves to not only highlight the 
unique approaches to examining various levels of analysis in agribusiness management research 
but as a consequence serves to advance the pluralistic nature of this field. Hence, it is such 
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